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Patient allocations according to circumstances and preferences: 
A model based on the Norwegian patient list system. 
 
In some countries, like Norway, every citizen has the right to obtain a designated general 
practitioner.  However, each individual may have preferences that cannot be fulfilled due to 
shortages of some kind. One example is the preference for having a general practitioner of the 
same sex, of the opposite sex, or be indifferent.  Available data indicate that female patients 
have a stronger preference for doctor of the same sex than male patients. When female doctors 
are less frequent than male doctors, everybody cannot get a doctor according to their preference, 
unless there are unacceptable loads and unacceptable vacancies.  To what extent can we expect 
that such preferences are fulfilled when the patients “compete” for entry on the lists? What 
changes in the distribution can we expect under changing conditions?  In particular, in the case 
of many women with strong preference for a female doctor, how will the fraction of female 
patients assigned to female doctors expect to change when the fraction of available female 
doctors increases? 
 
We have no ambitions to provide a dynamic analysis, describing changes at the micro level, i.e. 
how a patient having a doctor of  the ”wrong sex” initiates the search and may find a doctor of 
the “correct sex”. A change will typically take place only at a vacancy at a doctor in the 
neighbourhood, and this varies not only between urban and rural areas, but also within certain 
regions. Initial assignment and decrement also complicates the matter, and it is probably futile to 
model a dynamic allocation process. A number of assumptions have to be made, that may be 
disputed and hard to verify empirically.  Do we have alternatives that can provide insight?  
 
On the macro level it is well known that behaviour in many populations, among plants, 
animals and humans have cost minimizing traits.  For humans this was formulated by Zipf 
(1949). For localization problems we find the so called gravity model in the urban geography 
literature. This model is quite robust under varied circumstances, and has found applications in 
many fields, among them studies on travelling patterns and distribution of commodities in a 
network, and in tomography as well. Smith (1978) gave a formal statement of the Zipf 
principle, saying that patterns with lower total costs are at least as likely as those with higher 
costs.  On this basis Erlander & Smith (1990) developed a general theory of efficient 
population behaviour, leading to a representation theorem for the feasible patterns. Among 
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several special cases of this theory are situations leading to the gravity model. More recent 
contributions to this theory are given by Jørnsten et.al (2004). 
 
The problem of distribution of patients among doctors may be formulated within the gravity 
model. The model has its limitations, and is not flexible enough to pick up   interesting 
problems on the micro level. However, recent work by Jørnsten & Ubøe (2005) has provided 
opportunities for including more characteristics and restrictions of different nature. This is 
required if we think of using such models for planning purposes at the micro level. 
 
New contribution 
This paper contains new material to the medical and health profession on patient allocation 
according to circumstances and preferences, both with respect to modelling opportunities and 
qualitative results.  The paper is in two parts, the first is on macro modelling based on the 
gravity model, well known in some areas outside medicine, and the second is on micro 
modelling based on new theory reported in Ubøe & Lillestøl (2006). Although the problem 
came out of the Norwegian patient list system, the modelling approach and qualitative results 
have general applicability. We also hope that this paper may create some discussion on which 
restrictions exist in practice, as input for further development of the ideas. 
 
Macro analysis:  The gravity model 
 
What is the gravity model? Consider for example the travelling between residence and work, 
constituting the nodes in a network, where the distances between the nodes are given. The 
distances will influence the preferences for the locations, and therefore the travelling patterns 
between the nodes.  Formalizing this we have a set I of ”departure nodes” and a set J of 
”arrival nodes” and a distance function  d(i,j) defined for all pairs (i,j) in I x J. The gravity 
model then writes the probability of  ”travelling” from i to j as 
 
( , )( , ) c d i ji jP i j a b e
−= ⋅ ⋅  
 
where c is a coefficient expressing the sensitivity to distance. Sufficient assumptions on the 
marginals of P(i,j) leads to a unique solution of the gravity equation in terms of the 
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coefficients ai and bj. These coefficients may be calculated by an easily programmed and fast 
converging iterative process. In practice the restrictions may be derived from observed 
travelling patterns.  It is said that this model is implicit in software used by most public 
transportation departments 
 
Early on this was just an attractive model to represent data, but later it turned out that 
assumptions on ”efficient population behaviour” lead to the conclusion that the travelling 
probabilities could be expressed this way. The expression can be obtained under different 
assumptions, in an equilibrium sense, both with utility analysis and maximum entropy 
considerations. In the general theory it is more convenient to talk in terms of costs rather than 
distance, and the theory allows different types of costs (in the wide sense), e.g. direct 
travelling cost and travelling time.  The only difference is that this requires two constant 
terms in the exponent, each having a c-coefficient that can be estimated from data.  
 
The analogy to the above for allocating doctors to patients, is that we have four types of 
patients, males and females preferring doctor of the same sex or not, i.e. four ”departure 
nodes”, while we have two ”arrival nodes” male and female doctors.  Formally we can write I 
= {ff, fm, mf, mm}, where the first letter is the gender of the patient and the second letter is 
the preference for gender of assigned doctor. Furthermore   J = {F, M} with letters 
representing the gender of the assigned doctor. The analogy to distance is the felt nuisance of 
being assigned contrary to preference. As distance function one may simply use d(i,j) = 0 or 1 
according to whether the second letter in the ”departure node” corresponds to or deviates 
from  ”the arrival node” j, for example d(mf,F) = 0 while d(mk,M) = 1.  We have then 
implicitly assumed that the nuisance of having a doctor of  ”unwanted sex” is the same for 
men as well as for women. If we believe that the women feel this nuisance stronger, we may 
set d(kk,M) = 2 rather than 1.  A problem for practical application in the context of allocating 
patients to doctors, may of course be the specification of the differences and the strengths of 
the preferences.  
 
The model has several possible applications 
 
- estimate the parameters of the model from real data  
- gain insight by considering hypothetical situations by specification of parameters 
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We will here consider the latter opportunity. Although the absolute figures in a solution 
should not be taken as definite at the outset, it is possible to make comparisons under 
different assumptions, which in some cases lead to approximately the same result. Moreover, 
we can study what is most likely to affect changes in the allocation pattern, e.g. how the 
fraction of females assigned to female doctors changes as the fraction of female doctors 
increases.   
 
Even if we say that a certain fraction of patients would like to have doctor of a certain gender, 
the degree of nuisance by contrary allocation varies, both among the sexes and absolutely. 
Possible larger nuisance among the females than males, of having a doctor of the opposite gender 
contrary to preference, may be adjusted by enlarging the distance for this female group.  
Generally the strength of nuisance may be adjusted by a suitable weighing of the distance 
structure.  
 
We will now illustrate the gravity model in this context by numerical examples. We stress 
that the choice of numbers was solely to illustrate the main features of the model. However, 
the qualitative results obtained, were partly a surprise to the profession, and initiated some 
rethinking. Throughout in our illustrations we assume a population with equal number of 
male and female patients. As our point of departure we take a situation where 70% of the 
female patients would like a female doctor the most, if available, while 30% of them would 
like a male doctor the most. Among the male patients we assume an even distribution of 50% 
for male doctor and 50% for female doctor. In the gravity model we specify the ”distance”  
equal to 0 for allocations in concordance with the preferences and ”distance” equal to 1 for 
discordance between  preference and allocation.  
 
First we will look at how the fractions of females vary among doctors of each gender for 
increasing fraction of female doctors. They are given in Table 1 for preference strength c=1. 
 
Fraction  F-doctors 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Fraction   f among F 0.564 0.561 0.557 0.552 0.546 0.538 0.529 0.519 0.509 
Fraction  f among M 0.493 0.485 0.476 0.465 0.454 0.443 0.433 0.424 0.416 
 
Table 1. Fraction of female patients among female and male doctors for increasing fraction of 
available female doctors. 
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We see that the fraction of female patients is decreasing as the fraction of female doctors 
increases. This is so for doctors of both genders. With few female doctors, the fraction of 
female patients among them will be approximately 56%, and only decrease slowly until there 
is a more even number of doctors of the two genders, thereafter the fraction of female 
patients decreases more rapidly towards 50% of female patients among them. With few 
female doctors we see that the fraction of female patients among the male doctors is slightly 
below 50% and have a similar decreasing pattern. We also see that if the fractions of female 
and male doctors are equal, the fraction of female patients among the female and male 
doctors will be 54.6% and 45.4% respectively.   
 
Figure 1. Fraction of female patients as function of fraction female doctors 
among female and male doctors for fraction females preferring female doctors (60%, 70%, 
80%) all with male  preferences 50%-50%  (preference strength = 1) 
 
Figure 1 shows for moderate weights (c=1) the fraction of female patients among female and 
male doctors respectively as function of the fraction of female doctors in three situations, 
respectively where 60% (dotted line), 70%  (broken line) and 80% (solid line ) of the female 
patients prefer female doctors and male preferences in all three situations are 50-50.  The 
three upper curves are for female doctors, while the three lower ones are for male doctors.  
We see that all curves are monotonically decreasing, and that the decrease is slow until the 
fraction of female doctors is slightly above 50%, thereafter the decrease is more rapid. 
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We have performed similar computations for median/heavy weights (c=2), and for heavy 
weights (c=3) for the same distance structure. Results for the case of 70% females preferring 
a female doctor and the males are 50-50 are given in Table 2.  
 
 Fraction of f among F Fraction of f among M 
Fraction F-doctors 10% 30% 50% 10% 30% 50% 
Preference weight c=1 0.564 0.557     0.546 0.593 0.476 0.454 
Preference weight c=2 0.580 0.579 0.573 0.491 0.466 0.427 
Preference weight c=3 0.583 0.583 0.581 0.491 0.465 0.419 
 
Table 2. Influence of preference weights on the fraction of female patients among female and 
male doctors.  
 
The corresponding graphs (not given here) for moderate weights (c=2) are similar to c=1, 
with the two bundles of curves further apart, but the difference is surprisingly not that much.  
Heavier preference weights (c=3) gives results that do not deviate much from c=2, and less so 
for small fraction of female doctors, where the fraction of female patients among female 
doctors is just increased from 56% to 58%, and eventually starts to decrease more rapid 
above 50% female doctors. It may come as a surprise that the changes towards a larger 
fraction of female patients among female doctors are moderate as the preference strength 
increases. This may be interpreted as “limits to change” in a system where the felt nuisance 
for mismatch is the same for both gender, even if there is a strong majority of females feeling 
nuisance of a mismatch.  However, if we change the preference structure itself, we may 
obtain large differences. We will return to this later.   
 
Before turning to our next question, we note that the fractions considered above are tied 
together by a simple formula:  Let FF and FM be the fraction of female patients on the list of 
female and male doctors respectively, and let a be the fraction of female doctors. The 
specification of a, c and d determines FF and FM, and implicitly the corresponding fraction 
of male patients among the female and male doctors respectively as  1-FF and 1-FM.  
However, FF and FM are also tied together, since we in a population of even number of 
female and male patients have a·FF + (1-a)·FM = ½,  so that  FM = (1/2 - a · FF)/(1-a).  
 
Next we will look at the fraction of patients not allocated according to preferences. For short, 
we name these patients mismatched. We may study the fraction of mismatched patients 
among each gender of doctors and the fraction of mismatched patients of each gender of 
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patients as function of the fraction of female doctors. Computations using the gravity model 
for preference strength c=1 gave the results in Table 3 and are illustrated in Figure 2 and 3. 
 
Fraction F-doctors 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Mismatched Total 0.519 0.443 0.376 0.320 0.281 0.262 0.266 0.293 0.339 
Mismatched f-patients 0.601 0.508 0.423 0.349 0.290 0.251 0.234 0.239 0.263 
Mismatched m-patients 0.436 0.378 0.329 0.292 0.271 0.272 0.298 0.347 0.416 
Mismatched at F-doctor  0.094 0.108 0.127 0.150 0.181 0.218 0.261 0.308 0.355 
Mismatched at M-doctor 0.566 0.527    0.483 0.433 0.381 0.327 0.277 0.233 0.197 
 
Table 3.  Fraction of mismatched patients among each gender of  patients and the fraction of 
mismatched patients of each gender of doctors as function of the fraction of female doctors. 
 
Figure 2. Fraction mismatched patients as function of fraction female doctors (Case 70% ff-
50% mm, preference strength c=1) 
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Figure 3. Fraction mismatched at female and male doctors (Case 70% ff-50% mm, preference 
strength c=1)  
 
We see that the fraction of total mismatched is decreasing as the fraction of female doctors 
increases up to about the level where they are capable of accommodate the majority of female 
patients preferring a female doctor. Then the fraction of mismatched is increasing, since from 
then on more men are mismatched. A similar pattern is seen for both the female and male 
patients separately, except for the fact that the reversal for the males occurs at about 50%, as 
expected. Furthermore we see that the fraction mismatched at doctors of a give gender starts 
out low for the female doctors when they are few, and increases throughout as they become 
more abundant, ending with the situation where many of their patients are mismatched males.  
For male doctors the pattern is the opposite, starting out with a majority of male doctors with 
a large share of mismatched female patients, and ending up with few male doctors with 
mostly patients according to their preference. 
 
Our calculations on macro level are based on the assumption that the patient lists of all 
doctors are filled up, which means that adjustments to increase the total satisfaction at the 
micro level can be achieved by exchanging patients only.  Some doctors will in practice of 
course have vacancies on their lists, and will be able to accept new patients according to their 
stated preference. It is not obvious how this should be implemented in the model.  One 
possibility is to define a fifth fictitious patient category, representing an empty list position. If 
we are indifferent whether this happens to a male as female doctor, we can represent this with 
a zero in the distance function. We have performed calculations according to this and with 
different fractions for total vacancy regardless of gender, and it turned out that the 
distribution of patient gender on the lists of both male and female doctors changed 
surprisingly little. However, the under-represented gender of doctors, in view of the 
preferences, will of course experience less vacancy on their lists.  
 
Fraction F-doctor 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Vacant among F (10%) 0.064 0.070 0.076 0.083 0.090 0.095 0.100 0.102 0.102 
Vacant among M (10%) 0.104 0.107 0.110 0.111 0.110 0.107 0.101 0.094 0.086 
Vacant among F (20%) 0.134 0.146 0.158 0.171 0.182 0.192 0.199 0.203 0.203 
Vacant among M (20%) 0.207 0.214 0.218 0.220 0.218 0.212 0.202 0.189 0.175 
 
Table 4.  Fraction of vacancies for doctors of each gender for 10% and 20% total vacancy. 
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Table 4 shows the fraction of vacancies for doctors of each gender for 10% and 20% total 
vacancy respectively for the situation above, where 70% of the female patients want a female 
doctor, and the male patients were distributed even.  
 
In the situation with 30% female doctors and 10% total vacancy, that we have 7.6.% vacancy 
among the female doctors and 11.0% vacancy among the male. With total vacancy of 20%, the 
numbers are respectively 15.8% and 21.8%.  It may be of interest to regulate this such that the 
vacancies of both genders are about the same. For the case of lack of female doctors and where 
the males get the larger fraction of vacancies, we may change the “distance” between the 
categories “empty list position” and female doctor from zero to a positive number.  
 
With vacancies, the quantities are tied together as follows: Let t be the fraction of total 
vacancies, and TF and TM be the fraction of empty list positions among female and male 
doctors respectively. Let as before a be the fraction of female doctors, and FF and FM be the 
fraction of female patients among female and male doctors respectively, but now taken to be 
among the non-vacant entries. The specification of  t, a, c and d determines  TF, TM, FF and 
FM, and implicitly the corresponding fractions of male patients among  the female and male 
doctors as 1-FF and 1-FM respectively. TF, TM, FF and FM are, however, linked together 
since we in a population of equal number of men and women have that  
a·(1-TK) ·FF + (1-a)·(1-TM) ·FM = ½·(1-t). Given three of the quantities with capital letters, 
the forth is determined as well. 
 
In the examples above we have assumed that more women (70%) than men (50%) feel some 
nuisance with a doctor of the opposite sex, while the felt nuisance is about equal for both 
genders. We have seen that this difference between the genders do not put appreciable pressure 
towards skew distribution of patient gender for the doctors.  Only when this nuisance is felt 
stronger among women than men can we expect larger changes. If we again take the situation 
above, where 70% of the female patients will prefer a female doctor, and the male patients were 
distributed evenly, and where as before d(mm,  F) =1, but take d(ff,M) = 1, 2,  and 3 
respectively, we get the results of Table 5 for the cases of 0%, 10% and 20% total vacancy and 
30% female doctors (note that the fractions are with respect to the non-vacant entries) 
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Table 5.  Fraction of female patients and vacancies for doctors of each gender for 0%. 10% 
and 20% total vacancy. 
 
We see how the increased relative preference strength between females and males forces the 
fraction of females among female doctors to increase, while it is reduced among the males.  
We see, with increased fraction of vacancies, that the change caused by increased felt 
nuisance will be somewhat more rapid with respect to the move away from male doctors, 
while the increase among the female ones is slower. 
 
The fraction within each patient gender which does not get their primary wish fulfilled is also 
of interest and may be tabulated.  However, some information can be read from the table 
above, when we know that at the outset 70% of the female patients preferred a female doctor 
and just 50% of the male patients. For instance if we look at the situation in the rightmost 
column of  Table 5, we have 76.7% female patients among female doctors, and 35.9% female 
patients among male doctors. However, in both groups we have some who have fulfilled their 
primary wish, and some not. We have to increase the relative preference strength 
considerably in order for the fractions to approach 100% among female doctors and 0% 
among the male ones. The latter is in general not possible, but in the case of 20% total 
vacancy, we may in principle absorb all females according to their primary wish. 
 
 
Micro analysis: The benefit efficiency model 
 
In the examples above we have studied the problem at the macro level, with a large and 
undefined number of patients and doctors, where the focus quantity is fractions. We have 
limited ourselves to situation with sufficient capacity to cover the demand for a doctor of 
some gender. In reality a limited number of doctors are available in the neighbourhood. Some 
of them may be fully booked, and we can imagine situations with waiting lists. We may also 
Fraction of vacancies 0% 10% 20% 
Relative preference strength  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
F-doctors: Fraction f-patients  0.557 0.684 0.794 0.557 0.679 0.781 0.556 0.673 0.767 
F-doctors: Fraction vacant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.053 0.035 0.158 0.115 0.081 
M-doctors: Fraction f-patients  0.476 0.421 0.374 0.475 0.418 0.367 0.474 0.414 0.359 
M-doctors: Fraction vacant  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.120 0.128 0.218 0.236 0.251 
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have additional characteristics separating both the patients and the doctors. Recent theory 
based on the idea of  ”efficient behaviour” offers an opportunity to analyze various situations 
on the micro level, see Jørnsten & Ubøe (2005) for the general theory and Ubøe & Lillestøl 
(2006) for theory in the current context.   
 
We will here give some qualitative results coming out of this theory, see the appendix for a 
brief account of the main result on which the computations are based. As before we look at 
the four patient categories mm, mf, fm, ff. Suppose that the categories mm and ff have 
moderate preferences for a doctor of the same gender, while fm and mf feel some, but not 
particularly strong nuisance by a doctor of the opposite gender.  However, all categories feel 
a stronger nuisance by not being on the patient list of any doctor, i.e. being on a waiting list. 
For a start we assume that doctors are not penalized by not having their patient lists filled up. 
We will now find it more convenient to express the preferences in terms of  ”utility”,  taking 
both positive and negative values. A possible representation of the described situation by 
utility numbers is given in Table 6. 
 
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p mm-w mf-w fm-w ff-w vacancy
M-doctor 1 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 0 
F-doctor -1 0 0 1 -2 -2 -2 -2 0 
 
Table 6. Utility numbers for assignments to doctor patient/waiting list and vacancy. 
 
We will here consider situations with different number of available doctors of each gender. 
Assume first that all doctors have the same list length, and that we have the same number of 
patients in each of the four categories. It turns out that in the case of deficit of doctors, the 
expected number of patients in each of the four patient categories will differ between male and 
female doctors, but be the same for all doctors of the same gender. However, the expected 
number and the distribution of patient categories on the waiting list will be the same for all 
doctors irrespective of gender.  If we let the list lengths vary among doctors, but in a way so 
that the total numbers of patient entries are the same as above within each gender, it turns out 
that the fractions in each of the four patient categories are unchanged, while the number and 
distribution on the waiting list are unchanged. The relative distribution among the four patient 
categories on the patient list is therefore common for doctors of the same gender, so that the 
expected number is given by multiplication of the list length. Consider, as before, a situation 
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with equal number of patients in each of the four patient groups, but so few that there is a 
deficit of patients. Now it turns out that all doctors of the same gender have the same share of 
vacancy on their lists, but different between the genders. Let us look at some specific 
examples: 
 
Example  
Given a population of 16 000 persons in an area served by 7 doctors,  4 male and 3 female, all 
with list lengths 2000, represented by the vector (2000,2000,2000,2000,2000,2000,2000). 
Taking 4000 patients in each of the four patient categories, the expected distributions of the 
16 000 patients on the 14 000 patient entries or the waiting lists are given in Table 7, for each of 
the male and female doctors (table sums deviating from marginals are due to rounding errors): 
 
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p mm-w mf-w fm-w ff-w vacancy
M-doctor 835 509 509 147 51 84 84 67 1
F-doctor 102 458 458 981 51 84 84 67 1
 
Table 7.  Expected distribution of patients on patient list and waiting list for doctors of each 
gender (Doctors: 4 male, 3 female, Patients: 16 000, Entries: 14 000).  
 
If we introduce varying list lengths (1000,2000,2000,3000,1000,2000,3000), i.e. the total 
number of entries for male and female doctors are as above, the number of patients for doctor 
2, 3 and 6 are unchanged, while doctor 1 and 5 have cut their number of patients in half, and 
doctor 3 and 7 get their numbers multiplied by the factor 1.5.  The waiting list numbers are 
the same for all seven doctors. 
 
Now suppose we have 12 000 patients served by the 7 doctors, having 14 000 entries, but with 
varying list lengths as above, so that we have 14.3% total vacancy. Again assuming equal 
number of patients in the four categories, this time 3000, the model gives the allocation in 
Table 8, where we have lumped together the four waiting list groups, since they are all empty.  
 
We see that all male doctors have 14.9% expected vacancy, while the female doctors have 
13.5% expected vacancy.  
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Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p Waiting vacancy 
M-doctor 1 (1000) 343 223 223 62 0 149 
M-doctor 2 (2000) 686 446 446 124 0 298 
M-doctor 3 (2000) 686 446 446 124 0 298 
M-doctor 4 (3000) 1029 669 669 186 0 447 
F-doctor 1 (1000) 42 203 203 417 0 135 
F-doctor 2 (2000) 84 405 405 834 0 271 
F-doctor 3 (3000) 127 608 608 1251 0 406 
 
Table 8.  Expected distribution of patients and vacancies for each of 7 doctors with varying 
list lengths (Patients: 12 000, Entries: 14 000). 
 
 
We are now ready to study what happens when the preferences are changed. First, if we 
change all disutilities for being on the waiting list from -2 to -3 (or even -5), there will be no 
change in the table, telling that the message is picked up already at -2 for the case of lots of 
vacancies and no loss of vacancy. If we introduce a loss for the doctor for vacancy, e.g. 
replace 0 by -1, we also get the same result as above. To create a difference, we must have a 
difference between genders with respect to felt loss. If the female doctors feel this stronger 
than the male doctors, they will have less vacancies. Some of this is of course fairly obvious, 
but shows that the model gives meaningful results throughout. For instance, if we change the 
losses from -1 to  -2 for the female doctors, the expected vacancies among female doctors are 
reduced to 7.6%, while they among the male doctors are increased to 19.3.%.  By taking -5 
instead, the vacancies are changed to about 0.6% for female doctors and 24.6% for male 
doctors.  One may ponder on the kind of administrative means required for such a transfer of 
welfare. 
 
An interesting question is whether there are preference structures, where some doctors have 
vacancy, while there is a lack of doctors in the system as a whole.  There are! One example is 
when the ff-group prefers to be on the waiting list of a female doctor, instead of being 
assigned to a male doctor.     
 
In the discussion and examples for the micro-model, we have assumed an equal number of 
patients in the four patient categories. In our main macro-example of the preceding section 
we had 70% of the female patients favouring a doctor of the same gender, but 50% of the 
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males. However, both models are general and accommodate any configuration. We can also 
extend the macro-model to include waiting lists. 
 
In order to compare the results from the micro-model above with the macro-model, we may 
put heavy disutilities on waiting, so that this is ruled out. We will here consider cases where 
the number of entries exactly matches the number of patients, and put heavy disutility to wipe 
out vacancy as well.  Consider therefore 14 000 patients to be assigned to 7 doctors, each 
with 2000 available entries totalling 14 000, and where 3 out of 7 doctors are female i.e. 
42.8%. Assume first the same utilities for both gender, as we did for the macro-model (there 
measured by “distance”), and take the case of 70% of the female patients favouring a doctor 
of the same gender and 50% of the males.  The distribution of the four categories (mm, mf, 
fm, ff) is (3500, 3500, 2100, 4900)   and we take utilities -2 on waiting list and -2 for 
vacancy. We obtain the results given in Table 9. 
 
 
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p waiting vacancy 
M-doctors 725 348 435 487 5 5 
F-doctors 198 700 119 980 5 4 
 
Table 9.  Expected distribution of patients for each of 7 doctors with equal list lengths 2000 
and patients in categories (mm, mf, fm, ff) = (3500, 3500, 2100, 4900), for comparison with 
macro example. 
 
By changing the disutility for waiting and vacancy from -2 to -4 there will be none waiting 
and no vacancies.  This gives the fraction of female doctors assigned to male doctors 46.2% 
and to female doctors 55.1%, which is close to the numbers obtained for the macro-model.  
 
On the other hand, if we take the situation of stronger affection among the females mentioned 
above, we may specify the utilities as in Table 10. 
 
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p mm-w mf-w fm-w ff-w vacancy
M-doctor 1 0 0 -2 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 
F-doctor -1 0 0 2 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 
 
Table 10.  Utilities to reflect stronger dislike of vacancy and patients on waiting list. 
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The results for the micro-model and the macro-model coincides, and the computation 
gave the results in Table 11, for some group fractions of females preferring female doctors.   
 
 
% ff vs fm 10-90 20-80 30-70 40-60 50-50 
f among M-doctors 0.303 0.273 0.240 0.206 0.180 
f among F-doctors 0.763 0.802 0.846 0.890 0.923 
 
Table 11.  Computations for comparison with the macro model. 
 
At this point we are reminded that we can obtain major differences for the macro-model as 
well, it all depends on differences in the preference structure of the gender, and not so much 
on the number in each category and the absolute preference strength. In order to illustrate the 
sensitivity to change we take a macro example (with no vacancies and no waiting list), with 
equal number of patients in the four patient categories and utility structure as in Table 12. 
 
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p 
M-doctor 1 0 0 -x 
F-doctor -1 0 0 x 
 
Table 12. Utility structure to explore the sensitivity to change in female preferences for 
female doctor.  
 
In Figure 4 we plot, as function of x of Table 12, the fraction of female patients among 
female doctors (top three curves) and among male doctors (bottom three curves) for three 
fractions of female doctors 20%, 30% and 40% (in this order from top). Equal preferences 
correspond to x=1, and the most relevant part of the curves is to the right of this.  We see that 
the disparity of utility affects the female doctors more than the male doctors in this region, 
and that there is not much change beyond x=3. 
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Figure 4. Fraction of female patients among female and male doctors as function of disparate 
utility parameter x for different fractions of female doctors (20%, 30%, 40%). 
 
 
Further research: The inverse problem 
 
The theory and examples above have given valuable insights to qualitative issues, e.g. what 
affects the level and changes of allocations.   As such it may be of value to decision makers at 
the general policy level. For applications in the more local setting, we need to reveal the 
preferences of patients in some sense, and be able to translate this into utilities in the sense 
used above. This may be done by a suitably designed questionnaire, and is a research 
challenge in itself. Another approach would be to use observed allocations, and from this 
infer the utility structure. This may be called the inverse problem, and is also a research 
challenge in itself, mainly because a given allocation does not uniquely determine the 
utilities. In technical terms, we have an identification problem.  There are several solutions to 
this, now under investigation.  
 
The Norwegian system by which every inhabitant has the opportunity of having a designated 
general practitioner was introduced in the year 2001 and is monitored by the authorities.  
Detailed information on availability of doctors and list composition and vacancies are 
available, and may serve as a laboratory for both research and applications. To give an idea of 
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the kind of data available: At the end of the year 2004  the fraction of doctors with open lists 
was about 55%, 44% among female doctors and 59% among males in the country at large, 
while the corresponding numbers in the capital Oslo were 76%, 61% and 85%.  Such 
numbers are available also regionally and locally.  Movements over time are noticeable, and 
may indicate that the preference for a doctor of the same gender have increased since the 
system was introduced.   However, part of this may be due to a tendency for most newborn to 
be assigned to the doctor of their mother.  This raises an additional challenge, both for 
revealing real preferences and interpreting allocation data. It is possible that the solution to 
this is to combine the two approaches mentioned above. 
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Appendix 
 
Assume p patient categories and  q doctors  (named by j=1,2,…,q) of  r different types 
(named by k=1,2,…,r). Each doctor has a patient list with a given number of available entries 
and in addition a waiting list.  To each doctor we associate 2p+1 categories, first the p patient 
categories for registered patients (named by i=1,2,…,p), then the same p categories for the 
patients on the waiting list (named in the same order by i=p+1, p+2,…,2p), and finally the 
category i=2p+1 for registration of possible vacant entries. Let for k=1,2,…,r 
 
u(i,k) = Utility for patients of  type i assigned to a doctor of type k  (for  i=1,2,…,p) 
u(i,k) = Utility for patients of type i on the waiting list of a doctor of type k (for i=p+1,…,2p) 
u(i,k) = (Dis)utility per vacant entry of a doctor of type k (for i=2p+1) 
  
An assignment of all the patients to doctors and waiting lists, as well as vacancies, is judged 
by their total utility obtained by adding utilities over all patients. Let P(i,j,k) denote the 
probability of a patient/vacancy of type i (i=1,2,…,2p+1) belonging to doctor no. j 
(j=1,2,…,q) who is of type k. The assumption of  ”efficient system behaviour” amounts to 
saying that for two allocations, the one with the  higher total utility  is more probable. From 
this assumption it follows that the allocation probabilities can be written on the following 
form, see Ubøe & Lillestøl (2006): 
( , )
( , )
( , )
1, 2,....,
( , , ) 1, 2,...., 2
2 1
cu i k
i j
cu i k
i p
cu i k
j
a b e i p
P i j k a e i s p
b e i p
−
⎧ ⋅ ⋅ =⎪= ⋅ = +⎨⎪ ⋅ = +⎩
 
where the a’s and  b’s are coefficients determined by the restrictions in the situation, among 
others the list length of each doctor, and  typically also that it is an equal number of patients of 
each gender to be assigned. As for the gravity model c is the weight put on the differences in the 
assigned utilities. Note that a constant added to all utility numbers have no effect, since this is 
absorbed in the multiplicative constants a and b. Note also that if we multiply all utilities with 
the same positive number, we get the same solution, since the c-coefficient becomes rescaled as 
well, while the products are the same. Thus c may be taken as “numeraire”. 
 
Once we have specified c and the utilities u(i,k)  we have an equation system that can be 
uniquely solved numerically, for instance by extensions of the Bregman balancing algorithm, 
see Bregman (1967) and Jørnsten & Ubøe (2005). 
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